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Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional
Status of Unconstitutional Speech
Mark A. Graber 48 Vand. L. Rev. 349 (1995)
This Article explores whether contemporary advocates of restrictions
on bigoted expression have more in common with contemporary advocates of
broad First Amendment rights or with past censors. The critical theorists who
would ban some hate speech rely heavily on the equal citizenship principles
that radical civil libertarians believe justify almost absolute speech rights.
Past censors, however, also relied heavily on principles that libertarians in
their generation thought justified almost absolute speech rights. The First
Amendment, past and present censors argue, does not fully protect speech in-
consistent with what they believe are basic constitutional values. This claim
repudiates a basic principle of American constitutionalism, the faith that "self-
evident" constitutional values will triumph in the constitutional marketplace
of ideas. The ideological marketplace is dysfunctional in communities that do
not honor constitutional rights, but such communities do not restrict speech
that silences or harms traditionally subordinated groups.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Civil libertarians are being challenged to "hav[e] the courage to
change [their] ways of thinking when changing times require it.", A
new wave of racist, sexist, and heterosexist harassment has hit the
United States, and the doctrinal tools forged by liberals in the
McCarthy and Vietnam eras are unable to deal effectively with or
even acknowledge the harm caused by such vulgar expressions. The
pestilence of hate speech is particularly prevalent at universities,
institutions that ought to be bastions of tolerance and diversity.
Fortunately, a solution is at hand for progressives with the capacity to
engage in "creative" constitutional thinking. Led by Professors Mari
* Assistant Professor of Government, University of Maryland. Versions of this Article
were presented at the University of Wisconsin Law School and at the 1994 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association. I am grateful for the comments I received at those
fora and for additional suggestions offered by Scott Powe and Deborah Morris.
1. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 Duke L. J. 375, 430.
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Matsuda, Catharine MacKinnon, Richard Delgado, Charles Lawrence,
and Jack Balkin,2 critical legal, race, and feminist scholars have
reconceptualized First Amendment rights in ways that permit state
officials to adopt narrowly tailored3 restrictions on various forms of
racist, sexist, or heterosexist expression.
This new generation of censors claims no connection with those
narrow-minded bigots who previously censored advocacy of
revolutionary socialism, pacifism, and race equality. Indeed, most
critical theorists profess to be "ardent advocates of the freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment."4 Matsuda, Delgado, Lawrence,
MacKinnon, and Balkin oppose Supreme Court decisions upholding
the convictions of persons arrested for opposing World War I or
teaching Communism. 5 They claim to take seriously the Supreme
Court's recognition of our "national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."' Their
point is simply that hate speech is qualitatively different from the
kinds of expression that civil libertarians have historically defended
and should continue defending. Indeed, this failure to recognize the
2. For a collection of articles by some of these scholars, see generally Mar J. Matsuda, et
al., eds., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech and the First Amendment
(Westview, 1993); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (Harvard U., 1993); Balkin, 1990 Duke
L. J. 375; Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal
Liberty, 65 St. John's L. Rev. 119 (1991); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8
Cardozo L. Rev. 445 (1987).
3. Balkin would have us also "rethink the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth" when
analyzing "sexual and racial harassment." Balldn, 1990 Duke L. J. at 425.
4. Id. at 376. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, in Mar J. Matsuda, et al., eds., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory,
Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 17, 20 (Westview, 1993) (describing the contrasting
reactions by "target-group members" regarding racist speech as compared to the attitudes of
persons belonging to other groups); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in Mari J. Matsuda, et al., eds., Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 53, 57 (Westview, 1993)
(warning that the reasons for protecting racist speech should not be set aside hastily by those
who favor regulation).
5. See, for example, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute used to prosecute members of the Communist Party based on the
distinction between "advocacy" and "discussion"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654-55, 672
(1925) (refusing to overturn the conviction of a publisher of a Communist newspaper under
advocacy provisions of a criminal anarchy statute); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-
19, 624 (1919) (affirming the conviction of Marxist sympathizers for distributing anti-war
literature in violation of the Espionage Act).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See Richard Delgado,
Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343, 376
(1991) (listing the numerous "exceptions" to free speech that have been carved out by the
courts)."
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unique features of racist, sexist, and heterosexist invective explains
the obstinate opposition First Amendment absolutists express to
constitutionally legitimate regulations of hate speech.
Contemporary debates over hate speech proposals typically
focus directly on the constitutional and political merits of restricting
racist, sexist, and heterosexist expression. Proponents of regulation
insist that such bans do not violate the First Amendment, do not chill
constitutional expression, and will advance the cause of racial
equality. The leading critics of calls to regulate bigoted invective,
Nadine Strossen, Ronald Dworkin, Nat Hentoff, and Henry Gates,
question each claim. In their view, proposed bans on hate speech
violate constitutional rights, are more likely to be used against
powerless minorities than on their behalf, and do not attack the
serious problems that handicap persons of color and members of other
historically subordinated groups. 7
This essay enters the hate speech controversy from a more
historical perspective. I am particularly concerned with a debate
within the debate-the debate over whether contemporary advocates
of various restrictions on bigoted expression have more in common
with contemporary advocates of broad First Amendment rights or
with past censors. Too often, analyses of the relationships between
present proponents of bans on hate speech, present opponents of bans
on hate speech, and past proponents of other speech regulations only
explore the speech policies that different advocates have advanced in
different historical eras. The joint authors of Words That Wound, a
critical race manifesto that calls for various restrictions on assaultive
speech, insist that critical race theorists are friends of the First
Amendment because they would protect the rights of powerless po-
litical dissidents who criticize government policies. 8 Hentoff's Free
Speech for Me-But Not for Thee, by comparison, maintains that con-
temporary proponents of bans on hate speech and past censors share
7. See generally Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 Duke L. J. 484; Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography, 40 N.Y. Rev. of
Books 36 (Oct. 21, 1993); Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles over Free Speech, 39 N.Y. Rev. of
Books 55 (June 11, 1992); Nat Hentoff, Free Speech for Me-But Not for Thee: How the
American Left and Right Relentlessly Censor Each Other (Harper Collins, 1992); Henry Louis
Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, New Republic 37 (Sept. 20 & 27, 1993). See also Katharine T.
Bartlett and Jean OBarr, The Chilly Climate on College Campuses: An Expansion of the "Hate
Speech"Debate, 1990 Duke L. J. 574, 574 (explaining how the debate over hate speech "focuses
only on the most visible forms of racism, and thus misses those more subtle discriminatory
practices that pervade our current cultural milieu).
8. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 56 (cited in note 4); Matsuda, Public Response at 32-34
(cited in note 4).
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a common commitment to curbing expression they really detest.9
What is presently missing from this debate is any serious comparison
of the broader principles that animate progressive advocacy of and
opposition to campus speech codes, restrictions on pornography, and
related measures. 10 Do so-called "First Amendment absolutists" and
critical theorists disagree about the application of shared principles,
or is their dispute ultimately over fundamentally different theories of
free speech? If this dispute is over principle, do the principles
advocated by proponents of hate speech regulations resemble those
advocated by past advocates of speech regulation, or are those
principles consistent with an almost absolute protection for speech on
matters of public interest?
This attempt to put the contemporary hate speech controversy
into broader philosophical and historical contexts has significant
constitutional and political implications. Scholars who would ban
racist, sexist, and heterosexist invective insist that government can
regulate certain expressions of prejudice without violating First
Amendment values, as those values have historically been understood
by such progressive organizations as the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"). Lawrence, for example, maintains that "good
lawyers can create exceptions and narrow interpretations limiting the
harm of hate speech without opening the floodgates of censorship.""
Thus, critical theorists cannot make their case by establishing that
their proposed restrictions on racist and related doctrines would pass
muster under the restrictive speech tests announced in Schenck v.
United States12 or Dennis v. United States.'3 Rather, proponents of
campus speech codes and similar content restrictions must dem-
onstrate that their fundamental principles do not also support bans
on verbal opposition to a particular war or advocacy of revolutionary
socialism. If communities cannot regulate hate speech without
abandoning the philosophical and constitutional foundations for
9. Hentoff, Free Speech for Me at 1 (cited in note 7).
10. Critical theorists do not claim to share the constitutional values that underlie conser-
vative attacks on campus speech codes. Indeed, Delgado and Kimberle Crenshaw point out that
many (not all) right-wing opponents of "political correctness" are not troubled when restrictions
on speech serve business and traditional religious interests. See Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at
377-78 (cited in note 6); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black
Feminism and 2 Live Crew, in Mari J. Matsuda, et al., eds., Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, 111, 126-27 (Westview, 1993).
11. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 86 (cited in note 4). See Matsuda, Public Response at 35
(cited in note 4) (arguing for specific and narrow definition of racist speech that would allow
restrictions consistent with the First Amendment).
12. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
13. 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951).
352 [Vol. 48:349
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPEECH
protecting vigorous advocacy of unpopular social and political ideas,
then critical theorists can no longer pose as friends of the First
Amendment. They must either renounce their professed commitment
to free speech or their call for bans on racist, sexist, and heterosexist
expression.
Part II of this Essay suggests that critical theorists do have
much in common with left-wing opponents of bans on hate speech.
Critical theorists and their progressive rivals typically espouse some
version of radical civil libertarianism. The first radical libertarians,
members of Emma Goldman's political and social entourage, were
"commit[ted] to individualist anarchism, freethought, and free love."4
A related strain of radical civil libertarianism flourishes today in the
works of Kenneth Karst, Ronald Dworkin, Edwin Baker, David A. J.
Richards, Martin Redish, and Steven Shiffrin. 15 These jurists derive
free speech rights from the more general right of self-expression and
equal citizenship that serves as the foundation for such decisions as
Brown v. Board of Education,6 Griswold v. Connecticut,17 and Roe v.
Wade.18 Disputes between radical civil libertarians over proposed
bans on hate speech have centered on how government should apply
the constitutional principle of equal citizenship. Contemporary
progressives who oppose restrictions on bigoted expression insist that
government respects all citizens equally when all citizens are allowprl
to express their beliefs. Contemporary progressives who favor some
restrictions on bigoted expression insist that government respects all
persons equally when officials forbid speech that states or clearly
denies that some citizens are not worthy of equal concern or respect.
The Fourteenth Amendment, critical theorists maintain, permits and
may even require "content regulation of racist speech" that directly
challenges our constitutional commitment to equal citizenship. 19
14. David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of
Free Speech in American History, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 47, 53 (1992).
15. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Visions of Power in
the Politics of Race, Gender, and Religion (Yale U., 1993); Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to
America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (Yale U., 1989); Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (Harvard U., 1978); David A. J. Richards, A Theory of Free Speech, 34 UCLA L.
Rev. 1837 (1987); Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis (Michie, 1984);
C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford U., 1989); Steven H. Shiffrin,
The First Amendment, Democracy and Romance (Harvard U., 1990). Morris Ernst, a New
Dealer who fought against censorship and for birth control, is the main link between past and
present radical libertarians. See Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of
the ACLU 83-86 (Oxford U., 1990).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 66 (cited in note 4).
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Part III suggests a disturbing parallel between present and
past calls for restricting speech. Critical theorists correctly note that
earlier proponents of bans on speech would not restrict speech
inconsistent with the constitutional principle that all persons are
entitled to equal concern and respect. Rather, past censors typically
demanded that government forbid speech that was inconsistent with
what they thought were fundamental constitutional norms. During
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when most
constitutional commentators thought that the Constitution primarily
protected the freedom of contract and related liberties, the leading
intellectual proponents of restrictions on expression maintained that
government could ban speech inconsistent with the Constitution's
commitment to private property. During the middle of the twentieth
century, when most constitutional commentators maintained that the
Constitution primarily guaranteed rights to democratic processes, the
leading intellectual proponents of restrictions on expression insisted
that government could ban speech inconsistent with the
Constitution's democratic commitments. In other words, past
proponents of content restrictions have insisted that government has
the right to regulate unconstitutional speech, speech that challenges
the basic principles of the constitutional order. Critical theorists may
be the first scholars who explicitly maintain that the Fourteenth
Amendment vests governmental officials with the power to ban
unconstitutional speech, and they may present notions of
unconstitutional speech that differ from those advocated in the past.
Nevertheless, proponents of speech bans have always implicitly relied
on related notions of unconstitutional speech when justifying the
dominant content regulations of their era.
Part IV examines the constitutional status of unconstitutional
speech. Critical race theorists correctly recognize that the
Constitution recognizes a category of unconstitutional speech. Such
speech is not simply inconsistent with a constitutional provision,
decision, or rule. Unconstitutional speech implicitly or explicitly
challenges some fundamental value essential to the very being of the
Constitution. Nevertheless, Matsuda, Lawrence, and others are
mistaken when they assert that the Constitution does not protect
advocacy of unconstitutional ideas.20 The best reading of the
American Constitution as a whole is that "self-evident" constitutional
principles will compete successfully in the marketplace of ideas
20. Or that the government may, under the Fourteenth Amendment, ban the expression
of unconstitutional ideas.
354 [Vol. 48:349
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established by the First Amendment. Indeed, constitutional theory
presumes that citizens in a well-functioning constitutional democracy
will upon reflection affirm fundamental constitutional values. The
ideological marketplace may be dysfunctional in communities where
the vast majority of adults do not honor the basic constitutional right
of equal citizenship. Such localities, however, do not pass speech
restrictions aimed at ensuring that all persons are treated with equal
concern and respect.
II. THE TWO FACES OF RADICAL LIBERTARIANISM
Classical civil libertarians draw a sharp line between demo-
cratic inputs and democratic outputs. Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Alexander Meiklejohn, and John Hart Ely maintain that courts must
protect rights to democratic processes and the rights of minorities
that have no practical or legal access to democratic processes. The
classical civil libertarian Constitution, however, permits
democratically elected officials to make whatever substantive policies
they choose.21 For this reason, those democratic relativists who
support an almost absolute liberty of speech vigorously oppose both
the freedom of contract and the right to privacy when mandated by
courts, rather than legislatures.22 Indeed, Ely questions whether in a
world in which women vote freely and often, the Constitution should
be interpreted as forbidding most gender classifications. If "many
women . . . prefer the old stereotype to the new liberation," he
maintains, judges have no right to make "substantive wrong-
21. The major works of classical civil libertarianism include: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free
Speech in the United States (Harvard U., 1941); Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The
Constitutional Powers of the People (Oxford U., 1965); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust:
A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U., 1980). For related works, see generally Louis Lusky,
By What Right?: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Power to Revise the Constitution
(Michie, 1975); Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review
(Prentice Hall, 1966). The Carolene Products footnote is the best judicial expression of classical
civil libertarianism. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" may warrant "more
searching judicial inquiry"). For a general discussion of the philosophical and constitutional
underpinnings of classical civil libertarianism, see generally Mark A. Graber, Transforming
Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism (U. of California, 1991).
22. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4; Chafee, Free Speech at 360-61
(discussing the connection between allowing legislatures to regulate property and contracts, and
the need to ensure "liberty of discussion' to provide the integrity of democratic lawmaking);
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920, 937-43
(1973) (objecting to judicial protection of private property and privacy rights).
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headedness" the grounds for striking down laws based on traditional
sex roles.23
The current leading proponents of free speech, by comparison,
generally espouse a more radical civil libertarianism that erodes the
boundaries between substance and process. 4  Ronald Dworkin
maintains that government must treat all persons with "equal
concern and respect.25 Similarly, Kenneth Karst champions "the
principle of equal citizenship.26 In Karst's view, "every individual is
entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected and
responsible participant.''27 Unlike classical civil libertarians,
Dworkin, Karst, and other radical civil libertarians insist that the
Constitution sharply limits the substantive powers of democratically
elected officials. "[Judicial review of governmental action[,]" Karst
writes, "should focus . . on substantive concerns-specifically
concerns for the full inclusion of all Americans as equal citizens" and
"not so much on 'procedural' questions (such as the representative or
deliberative qualities of the legislative process)....28
Radical civil libertarians maintain that courts should protect
free speech in part because speech plays a crucial role in human de-
velopment.29 "[Flreedom of speech is fundamental," Professor C.
Edwin Baker declares, "because freedom to engage in self-expressive
acts is central to individual liberty."3 0  Similarly, Rogers Smith's
"rational liberty view" provides full constitutional protection to "forms
of self-expression that are part of a person's rational self-
development."31 The leading defenders of expression rights on the late
23. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 167 (cited in note 21).
24. The emergence of radical civil libertarianism in the 1970s was, alas, not acknowledged
in the Author's work Transforming Free Speech (cited in note 21). The following paragraphs
attempt to correct that error.
25. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 272-73 (cited in note 15).
26. Karst, Law's Promise at x (cited in note 15).
27. Id. See Richards, 34 UCLA L. Rev. at 1867 (cited in note 15) (noting "the abolitionist
principles of equal respect!'.
28. Karst, Law's Promise at xi.
29. Most radical civil libertarians also regard free speech as an important element of the
democratic process. Unlike classical civil libertarians, however, radical civil libertarians do not
believe that the First Amendment only protects political speech, no matter how broadly political
speech is defined.
30. C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More than Words, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1197 (1994).
31. Rogers M. Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law 240 (Harvard U.,
1985). See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 4 (Random
House, 1966) (stating that "[the right to freedom of expression is justified first of all as the right
of an individual purely in his capacity as an individual'; Richards, 34 UCLA L. Rev. at 1876
(cited in note 15) (emphasizing "equal respect for their right to exercise the essential moral
powers of their rational and reasonable humanity in the formation, exercise, and revision of
their ultimate values in living"); Jeffrey Rosen, The Limits of Limits, New Republic 35, 38 (Feb.
356 [Vol. 48:349
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Warren and Burger courts also gave more weight than did classical
civil libertarians to individual interests in free speech. Former
Justice Brennan declared in an influential speech at Georgetown
University that "[r]ecognition of these rights of expression and
conscience frees up the private space for both intellectual and
spiritual development free of government dominance .... 3 2
Jurists who regard self-expression as a fundamental right are
as likely to associate free speech with the right to privacy as with the
right to vote. Thomas Emerson, the most influential proponent of
broad speech rights in the 1960s and 1970s,33 helped lead the fight for
birth control rights.34 Justice William 0. Douglas's concurring opinion
in Doe v. Bolton35 asserted that constitutional expression and abortion
rights could both be derived from the more general Fourteenth
Amendment right to "autonomous control over the development and
expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality. 36
Many influential radical civil libertarians maintain that all
content based restrictions on free speech violate the constitutional
right to autonomy and privacy. "[E]qual respect for persons[,1" David
A. J. Richards asserts, "means equal respect for the independence of
all speakers" and "[t]his respect is most principled when it guarantees
the evaluative and expressive freedoms of the speakers whose speech
we most conscientiously reject and despise."37 Progressive opponents
of campus speech codes and related measures insist that the
government cannot regulate speech on the basis of any notion of the
good society, even a society based on the principles of radical civil
libertarianism. Robert Post, for example, asserts that "the value of
autonomy ... requires that all possible objectives, all possible ver-
sions of national identity .. . be rendered problematic and open to
inquiry.' 'S If government must treat its citizens as free and equal
7, 1994) (endorsing an "individualist conception of the First Amendment that would protect self-
expression for its own sake" without judging its value).
32. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Federalist Society, Address to the Text and Teaching
Symposium, Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our
Written Constitution 22 (Federalist Society, 1986).
33. See generally Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (Random
House, 1970); Emerson, Toward a General Theory (cited in note 31).
34. Emerson represented Planned Parenthood of Connecticut in oral argument in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See David J. Garrow, Liberty & Sexuality: The
Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 231-41 (Macmillan, 1994) (discussing the
preparation of the briefs in Griswold).
35. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
36. Id. at 211 (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. Richards, 34 UCLA L. Rev. at 1899 (cited in note 15).
38. Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1119 (1993).
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people, he declares, then "the notion that racist ideas ought to be
forbidden within public discourse... is ... fundamentally irrecon-
cilable with the rationale for [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms."3 9 Baker
similarly argues that "government must not choose as its end or its
means the suppression of expressive options.40
Progressive opponents of restrictions on certain expressions of
prejudice maintain that campus speech codes, bans on pornography,
and similar regulations violate human autonomy and equality. Such
measures unconstitutionally discriminate against persons who hold
unpopular social or political opinions. "No one[,]" Ronald Dworkin
maintains, "may be prevented from influencing the shared moral
environment, through his own private choices, tastes, opinions and
example, just because these tastes or opinions disgust those who have
the power to shut him up or lock him up."'41 Nadine Strossen insists
that "[i]n a society that respects the autonomy and dignity of
individuals, all people would be free to express their views, no matter
what their views or who they were.' 42 Restrictions on speech that are
aimed overtly at the tone or manner of presentation may privilege the
expressive techniques that established social groups prefer. Karst
points out that the "kinds of expression... we consign to the category
of Unreason" tend to be "(i) speech that rejects the common sense of
what 'we all know,' where 'we' are those who share the conventional
wisdom and morality; and (ii) modes of expression-from silent sit-
ins to noisy demonstrations-that go against the dominant cultural
grain."43 Thus, bans on speech that do not seem to communicate ideas
are more likely to burden members of politically powerless groups
than to promote vigorous dissent by them. "Political expression at the
cultural boundaries[,]" Karst notes, "typically is not deliberative, and
often is not civil.""
Contemporary advocates of restrictions on speech share the
radical civil libertarian commitment to equal citizenship. Mary Ellen
Gale maintains that "the universal right to self-respect and self-
39. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 267, 291 (1991).
40. Baker, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1206 (cited in note 30).
41. Dworkin, 40 N.Y. Rev. of Books at 41 (cited in note 7).
42. Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil
Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 143, 151 (1994). See
Richards, 34 UCLA L. Rev. at 1886 (cited in note 15) (stating that "group libel laws... dis-
criminate between legitimate and illegitimate expressions of conscientiously held and contro-
versial views criticizing the values in living").
43. Karst, Law's Promise at 11 (cited in note 15) (footnote omitted).
44. Id. See Post, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 286-87, 303-04 (cited in note 39) (stating that
censorship cuts off participation in the process of collective self-determination).
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realization" is "the most important of democratic beliefs. 45 Matsuda
describes the principle that "[e]ach person . . . is entitled to basic
dignity, to nondiscrimination, and to the freedom to participate fully
in society" as "central . . . to the Bill of Rights .. *"46 Following
Emerson and other radical civil libertarian defenders of expression
rights, critical theorists emphasize how free speech rights enable
persons to participate in society and develop as individuals.
Constitutional liberty, Gale claims, must "encompass the freedom to
construct an authentic self, who can make her own choices and
explore her own possibilities."47
Many critical theorists insist that these radical civil libertarian
principles justify certain content restrictions on speech that deny the
equal citizenship of some members of the American community.
Delgado claims that the interest of "personality and equal citizenship"
entails "the right of all citizens to lead their lives free from attacks on
their dignity and psychological integrity. 48 MacKinnon boldly
asserts that the First Amendment cannot protect advocacy of certain
doctrines "if real equality is ever to be achieved."49 "When equality is
recognized as a constitutional value and mandate," she declares,
"social inferiority cannot be imposed through any means, including
expressive ones."50  Free speech absolutists, in her view, must
"seriously reconsider[ I . . . [t]he current legal distinction between
screaming 'go kill the nigger' and advocating the view that African-
Americans should be eliminated from parts of the United States .... 51
Lawrence argues that the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes
elected officials to limit advocacy that is inconsistent with the un-
45. Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 126 (cited in note 2).
46. Matsuda, Public Response at 48 (cited in note 4). See Lawrence, If He Hollers at 59
(cited in note 4) (suggesting that a broad reading of Brown v. Board of Education encompasses
the principle of equal citizenship); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling, in Mari J. Matsuda, et al., eds., Words That Wound:
Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment 89, 92-93 (Westview, 1993)
(emphasizing that racism is a breach of egalitarian principles); Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at
383 (cited in note 6) (noting "the values of equal personhood we hold dear). See also
MacKinnon, Only Words at 106 (cited in note 2) (noting that when equality is taken seriously,
expressive statements are not constitutionally insulated on the ground that ideas cannot be
regarded as false).
47. Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 170 (cited in note 2). See Balkin, 1990 Duke L. J. at 385
(cited in note 1) (discussing the feasibility of applying legal realist critique of rights in First
Amendment jurisprudence).
48. Delgado, Words That Wound at 110 (cited in note 46).
49. MacKinnon, Only Words at 108 (cited in note 2).
50. Id. at 106.
51. Id. at 108. See Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 164 (cited in note 2) (discussing the
regulation of discriminatory verbal harassment on college campuses).
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derstanding of constitutional equality that served as the foundation
for the successful legal attack on Jim Crow institutions. Lawrence
claims that Brown v. Board of Education "reflects the understanding
that racism is a form of subordination that achieves its purposes
through group defamation."52  The Supreme Court, in his opinion,
"held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily because
of the message segregation conveys-the message that Black children
are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white children. ' 3
These legal precedents, Lawrence concludes, "commit[ ] us to some
regulation of racist speech."' That campus speech codes and other
bans on hate speech prohibit private as well as public defamation is
immaterial. Lawrence points out that the Supreme Court did not let
Southern states abandon public schooling in the wake of Brown. The
judicial refusal to sustain a system of private segregation in Griffin v.
County School Board of Prince Edward County,55 he declares,
establishes that "the defamatory message of segregation [should) not
be insulated from constitutional proscription simply because the
speaker [is] a nongovernmental entity.56
Critical theorists maintain that state decisions not to regulate
hate speech abridge the equal citizenship rights of persons of color,
women, and other victims of assaultive expression. Racist, sexist, and
heterosexist invective adversely influences the ways in which persons
of color, women, and homosexuals see themselves and are seen by
others. "[R]acist speech[,]" Delgado claims, "is the means by which
society constructs a stigma-picture of disfavored groups. '57 When
bigoted messages flood the marketplace of ideas, those historically
disadvantaged persons who are not dissuaded from speaking are
typically not heard by the general populace. Not only do "minority
children" who "constantly hear racist messages.., come to question
their competence, intelligence, and worth,"58 but, as Delgado notes,
the "system of ideas and images" promoted by hate speech "constructs
certain people so that they have little credibility in the eyes of
52. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 75 (cited in note 4).
53. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 58. See id. at 61 (stating that "antidiscrimination laws are primarily regulations
of the content of racist speech'; David Cole, Hate Crimes and the Fine Line, Legal Times 27
(March 15, 1993); Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 152-53 (cited in note 2).
55. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
56. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 65 (cited in note 4). See Matsuda, Public Response at 48
(cited in note 4) (arguing that the underlying values of the First Amendment are sacrificed
when hate speech is protected); Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 154, 157 (cited in note 2)
(discussing an equality-based theory of the First Amendment).
57. Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 387 (cited in note 6).
58. Delgado, Words That Wound at 95 (cited in note 46).
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listeners.' 9 These biases have created a dysfunctional marketplace of
ideas. Gale asserts that "the playing field is not level, but tilted to
favor the status quo--in this case, racism and sexism."60 Banning
certain forms of hate speech, in her view, will simply "remove the tilt
and level the field.... ."61 Many proponents of bans on hate speech
also insist that the invective they would prohibit is not really speech
at all. "Racial insults," Lawrence asserts, "are undeserving of first
amendment protection because the perpetrator's intention is not to
discover truth or initiate dialogue, but to injure the victim.62
MacKinnon points out that "[p]ornography consumers are not
consuming an idea any more than eating a loaf of bread is consuming
the ideas on its wrapper. ''s3
Critical theorists claim that officials who refuse to ban hate
speech force persons of color and other members of socially marginal
groups to pay more than their fair share of the social price for free
speech. Matsuda regards "[t]he application of absolutist free speech
principles to hate speech... [as] a choice to burden one group with a
disproportionate share of the costs of speech promotion."' 'Tolerance
of hate speech," she adds, "is a psychic tax imposed on those least able
to pay."' 8  Several commentators suggest that official toleration of
hate speech aggravates the initial harm that such invective is re-
sponsible for. Delgado charges that the "failure of the legal system to
redress the harms of racism and racial insults conveys to all the
59. Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to First Amendment
Legal Realism, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 169, 171 (1994). See Lawrence, If He Hollers at 62
(cited in note 4) (asserting that racist speech "limit[s] the life opportunities of others); Gale, 65
St. John's L. Rev. at 148 (cited in note 2) (arguing that "racism and sexism... have functioned
. .. as an informal system of censorship); Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1287 (1992) (claiming that "even when minorities do speak they have very
little credibility"); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 291, 295-96 (1989) (stating
that pornography subordinates and silences women); Balkin, 1990 Duke L. J. at 421 (cited in
note 1) (positing that group harassment intimidates the victim into not fighting back). See also
Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 219-20 (Free, 1993) (noting that
pornographic speech may silence women, but avoiding that claim as a basis for limiting First
Amendment rights).
60. Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 157.
61. Id. at 158. See Lawrence, If He Hollers at 77 (cited in note 4); Delgado, 29 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. at 171 (cited in note 59).
62. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 68. See Delgado, Words That Wound at 107-08 (cited in
note 46) (arguing that racial insults inhibit the development of productive members of society).
See also Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 797, 802, 807 (1993)
(discussing what is considered speech and what is considered conduct).
63. MacKinnon, Only Words at 16 (cited in note 2).
64. Matsuda, Public Response at 48 (cited in note 4).
65. Id. at 18.
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lesson that egalitarianism is not a fundamental principle .... -66
Matsuda speaks of "the pain of knowing that the government provides
no remedy and offers no recognition of the dehumanizing experience
that victims of hate propaganda are subjected to."16 Progressives who
defend the local bigot, in this view, confirm perceptions that victims of
hate speech are second-class citizens. "[N!onwhite students feel
abandoned[,]" Lawrence reminds radical civil libertarians, "[w]hen the
ACLU enters the debate by challenging... efforts to provide a safe
harbor for... Black, Latino and Asian students.... .,61
Nevertheless, none of these admitted evils, standing alone or
in combination, meet traditional civil libertarian requirements for
banning speech. Much speech attempts to construct a stigma-picture
of hated rivals. Garry Trudeau's use of Mr. Butts in Doonesbury, for
example, is clearly designed to "construct" tobacco executives "so that
they have little credibility in the eyes" of the public. The vicious
attacks on President Clinton in the right-wing media serve a similar
purpose. The marketplace of ideas always favors the status quo, and
most speech that favors the status quo disproportionately harms
society's traditional losers. Although critical theorists sometimes
suggest that the First Amendment only protects the right to criticize
state policies,69 no traditional libertarian has ever suggested that the
Constitution offers less protection to speakers who oppose radical
social change.70 Political conservatives have a right to condemn
welfare (and "welfare queens") even though such attacks may impose
66. Delgado, Words That Wound at 93 (cited in note 46).
67. Matsuda, Public Response at 49 (cited in note 4). See Balkin, 1990 Duke L. J. at 377,
381 (cited in note 1) (arguing that "the state has chosen to value the expressive liberty of racists
over the feelings of their victims").
68. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 86 (cited in note 4).
69. See MacKinnon, Only Words at 39 (cited in note 2) (discussing the different treatment
of expression considered pornographic and expression that advances the overthrow of govern-
ment); Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 134-35, 140-41 (cited in note 2) (noting that the difficulty in
distinguishing between speech that makes a statement about government and speech focusing
on religion, obscenity, or race). See also Balkin, 1990 Duke L. J. at 425-26 (cited in note 1)
(suggesting that weakening the overbreadth doctrine would be appropriate when "the danger is
that a vague or overly broad statute will chill conduct by the more powerful party').
70. Limiting speech rights to criticisms of the status quo would inevitably create the
problems that the First Amendment was designed to avoid. No agreement exists as to what
constitutes the present status quo in the United States. Gale may claim that "today's Nazis
[and] Ku Klux Klan members . . . represent an overt expression of covert, or thinly veiled,
majoritarian views." Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 141. More conservative thinkers, however,
are likely to see Gale's opinions as more representative of the political mainstream.
Furthermore, critical theorists need to consider what should constitute the relevant status quo.
For example, would a racist speech be considered a criticism of the status quo if made at the
Michigan Law School or in Professor MacKlnnon's class? For similar arguments, see Sunstein,
Democracy at 239 (cited in note 59) (noting the difficulty for the government in determining the
status quo).
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substantial costs on poor persons and persons of color. Finally,
although the pure insult may communicate no ideas, most racist in-
sults do. Lawrence admits that the racial caricature of Beethoven
that was partly responsible for the movement to limit speech at
Stanford University conveyed the message that persons of color are
not capable of musical genius. The defaced poster, he asserts, was "a
graphic footnote to the argument... that there [are] no significant
non-European contributions to be included" in the academic
curriculum .1 However offensive and wrong, this is an idea that is
ordinarily subject to First Amendment strictures.
These objections are only fatal to proposed restrictions on hate
speech if bigoted invective enjoys the same constitutional protection
as other offensive expressions of political beliefs. Proponents of
campus speech codes, bans on pornography, and related measures,
however, insist that all restrictions on speech need not be content
neutral7 2 Matsuda, Lawrence, MacKinnon, and others maintain that
the First Amendment does not fully protect the advocacy of racist,
sexist, and heterosexist doctrines. The Fourteenth Amendment, these
critical theorists state or imply, amended the First Amendment so as
to give Congress and state legislatures the power to pass laws
restricting expression that denies or threatens the equal citizenship
rights of traditionally subordinated groups.
MacKinnon bluntly states that the Constitution does not
"require[ ] that the state remain neutral as between equality and
inequality .... "13 Her Only Words sharply criticizes the view that "the
upheaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not
move the ground under the expressive freedom, setting new limits
and mandating new extensions 74 and the view that "Fourteenth
Amendment equality . . . [can] be achieved while the First
Amendment protect[s] the speech of inequality. . .. ,,75 MacKinnon
thinks that once Americans reinterpret the First Amendment in light
of the Fourteenth, they will easily be able to distinguish constitutional
restrictions on hate speech from unconstitutional restrictions on the
advocacy of progressive reform. "[T]he piously evenhanded treatment
of the Klan and [NAACP] boycotters[,]" in her view, ignores the fact
71. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 85 (cited in note 4).
72. For a discussion of the central role that neutrality plays in the modem defense of free
speech, see Donald Alexander Downs, The New Politics of Pornography 3-8, 146-52 (U. of
Chicago, 1989).
73. MacKinnon, Only Words at 107 (cited in note 2).
74. Id. at 71.
75. Id. at 72.
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that "the Klan was promoting inequality and the civil rights leaders
were resisting it, in a country that is supposedly not constitutionally
neutral on the subject."76
This perceived conflict between the rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth amendments plays a crucial role in virtually all
defenses of bans on racist speech. Although other critical theorists do
not explicitly claim that the Equal Protection Clause amended the
Free Speech Clause, all see "a possibly inescapable tension between
our commitments to the First Amendment and to equal protection. ''77
First Amendment absolutists who would never ban speech, Gale
declares, fail to acknowledge that "the commitment to eradicate
racism and ensure equality is part of the same Constitution that
protects free expression. . . .78 For this reason, constitutional
authorities considering whether to adopt or sustain bans on hate
speech should resolve this potential constitutional contradiction by
giving equal weight to the expression rights recognized by the First
Amendment and the authority to promote equal citizenship granted
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although civil libertarians have
historically opposed the use of balancing tests in First Amendment
jurisprudence, critical theorists claim that justices must balance First
Amendment liberties against equal citizenship rights in hate speech
cases because elected officials are not simply trying to advance a
legitimate social interest, but are seeking to vindicate a constitutional
right as important as the right to free expression. "[Tihe alternative
to regulating racist speech[,]" Lawrence points out, "is infringement of
the claims of Blacks to liberty and equal protection. 79
In short, critical theorists believe that legislatures and uni-
versities can ban certain expressions of prejudice because the First
Amendment does not fully protect unconstitutional speech, speech
that denies or threatens the realization of fundamental constitutional
values. Lawrence openly asserts that "white supremacists' conduct or
76. Id. at 86.
77. Cole, Legal Times at 27 (cited in note 54).
78. Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 166 (cited in note 2). See Lawrence, If He Hollers at 56,
71 (cited in note 4) (emphasizing that despite First Amendment protections, many civil
libertarians overlook the injury inflicted by racist speech); Balkin, 1990 Duke L. J. at 422-23
(cited in note 1) (noting the First Amendment concerns when damages are awarded for
harassment); Delgado, Words That Wound at 108-09 (cited in note 46) (stating that "[riacial
insults... are severely at odds with the goals of antidiscrimination laws and the commands of
the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment").
79. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 64. See Matsuda, Public Response at 48-49 (cited in note
4) (identifying government protection of hate group activity as a "doctrinal pillar supporting
racist speech").
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speech is forbidden by the equal protection clause."8 Racist speech is
no different from racist acts, in his view, because both seek "the
institutionalization of the [unconstitutional] ideas of white
supremacy." 1 At the very least, government officials should have the
authority under the Reconstruction amendments to limit speech that
fails to treat persons of color or other members of historically
subordinated groups with equal concern and respect. Delgado asserts
that educational institutions have the power to protect core
Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendment values by enacting
"reasonable regulations aimed at assuring equal personhood on
campus.52
Many mainstream proponents of more limited bans on hate
speech or pornography rely on similar notions of unconstitutional
speech. Cass Sunstein thinks that the First Amendment does not
protect "forms of hate speech" that "amount to a denial of the premise
of political equality that is central to a well-functioning democracy."83
Smith would ban "expression that is noncognitive in form and which
in substance conveys an emotive message that has no value or is
actually immoral in terms of rational liberty standards."84  By
comparison "emotive expression aimed at furthering legitimate
political, intellectual, or cultural goals," in his view, "is still too
integral to the aims of rational liberty to evoke less than strict
scrutiny."s5 As these passages indicate, Smith does not think that
bans on emotive or noncognitive racist speech pass constitutional
muster because the First Amendment does not protect emotive or
noncognitive speech, and elected officials have the power to decide
that some forms of noncognitive speech are worse than others.86
80. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 61.
81. Id.
82. Delgado, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 346 (cited in note 6). See Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
802 (cited in note 62) (discussing the means of balancing both free speech principles and anti-
caste concerns).
83. Sunstein, 60 U. Chi. L, Rev. at 814-15.
84. Smith, Liberalism at 242 (cited in note 31).
85. Id.
86. As Sunstein points out, elected officials may constitutionally determine that some
forms of constitutionally unprotected speech are more harmful than others. Sunstein, 60 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 825 (cited in note 62). Although he sometimes suggests that states can regulate
violent pornography in order to "diminish[ I views that contribute to existing inequalities,"
Sunstein, Democracy at 219 (cited in note 59), Sunstein more frequently claims that "some
pornographic materials" can be regulated because, for reasons other than viewpoint, such
material "lies at the periphery of constitutional concern." Id. at 215. See id. at 215-16, 221, 226
(arguing for the regulation of a narrowly defined class of pornographic materials). For an
argument that violent pornography should be banned on similar grounds, see Downs, The New
Politics of Pornography at 152-55, 162-65, 194-98 (cited in note 72).
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Rather, he insists that the Constitution protects emotive or
noncognitive speech that communicates constitutionally permissible
messages. Unconstitutional emotive or noncognitive speech differs
from constitutional emotive or noncognitive speech, in his view, solely
because the former communicates unconstitutional beliefs.
Determining the particular manifestations of unconstitutional
speech that radical civil libertarians would actually ban is difficult.
Different scholars have proposed different regulations. Moreover,
many critical theorists combine fairly strong theoretical arguments
with fairly modest proposals. MacKinnon and Matsuda clearly state
that the First Amendment does not protect the advocacy of specific
doctrines, for example, the claim that the Holocaust never happened.
87
Other proponents of narrow content regulations typically focus on
constitutionally borderline speech, in particular, insults. 8  Only
Smith (and perhaps Gale), however, explicitly states that
"communication that is clearly an exposition of ideas ... merits full
[First Amendment] protection. 89 Nevertheless, even these moderate
proponents of content restrictions maintain that speech may lose
constitutional protection solely because that speech challenges
fundamental constitutional norms.90
III. THE PRESENT AND PAST OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPEECH
Those critical theorists who would ban certain expressions of
prejudice correctly note that past proponents of content restrictions
never asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal
citizenship amended the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
Thus, Matsuda, Lawrence, and their allies can claim to have crafted a
new exception to free speech principles, one that is derived from the
same radical civil libertarian principles that animate much
contemporary free speech thought. Radical civil libertarians agree
that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution as a whole
87. MacKinnon, Only Words at 98-99 (cited in note 2); Matsuda, Public Response at 42
(cited in note 4).
88. See Delgado, Words That Wound at 106-09 (cited in note 46); Lawrence, If He Hollers
at 66-71 (cited in note 4).
89. Smith, Liberalism at 242 (cited in note 31). Gale declares that elected officials can
"regulat[e] ... some categories of racist' and similarly prejudiced speech. Gale, 65 St. John's L.
Rev. at 164 (cited in note 2). When discussing specific examples, however, she indicates that the
Constitution protects all racist speech, no matter how offensive, that "constitutes a contribution
to ... public dialogue about race and racism." Id. at 179 (defending the right to deface racially a
poster of Beethoven).
90. See notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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protect a broadly understood right to equal concern and respect, a
right that encompasses both the liberty to participate as an equal in
communal life and the right to choose one's personal lifestyle free
from unwarranted communal interference. Proponents and oppo-
nents of campus speech codes and bans on pornography apparently
disagree only over the application of equal citizenship principles to
speech that denies or threatens the equal citizenship rights of some
members of the American community.
Philosophical and historical investigation, however, indicates
that efforts to regulate unconstitutional speech seriously undermine
generally accepted libertarian understandings of First Amendment
rights. The argument that critical theorists rely on to justify limiting
expression that denies or threatens equal citizenship rights is sound
only if constitutional authorities agree that equal citizenship rights
are central to the constitutional order. Whether persons have a
constitutional right to vilify homosexuals, in their view, depends on
there being a constitutional right to engage in gay sex. This claim
was recently rejected by the Supreme Court.91 More significantly, the
concept of unconstitutional speech can be used to ban much
progressive advocacy. Some radical civil libertarian doctrines will
become subject to regulation should the Fourteenth Amendment and
Constitution be construed as protecting more conservative values, for
example, the values underlying laissez-faire capitalism. Indeed,
various notions of unconstitutional speech played crucial roles in past
judicial and political efforts to suppress the voices of unpopular
political dissenters.
The leading conservative proponents of restrictions on speech
during World War I and the Red Scare maintained that persons had
no constitutional right to attack what they believed to be the essential
principles of republican government.92 Unlike progressive opponents
of restrictions on speech, who relied on a bad tendency test,93 the
91. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does
not confer the right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
92. The following discussion of conservative support for restrictions on speech before
World War II is a lightly edited version of Graber, Transforming Free Speech at 46-48 (cited in
note 21).
93. See id. at 83-86. The only two Supreme Court opinions to rely explicitly on the bad
tendency test, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919), were authored respectively by Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and John Clarke.
Both jurists were firm opponents of the liberty of contract. See Lochner v. United States, 198
U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating it is well settled that states may pass laws
that interfere with the freedom to contract); John H. Clarke, Judicial Power to Declare
Legislation Unconstitutional, 9 A.B.A. J. 689, 692 (1923) (claiming that justices should sustain
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leading judicial and academic supporters of the "night watchman"
state maintained that government in peacetime could only regulate
the advocacy of those doctrines that denied fundamental constitu-
tional truths.94 In Gitlow v. New York, 95 for example, Justice Edward
Sanborn asserted that the freedom of speech "does not include the
right virtually to destroy" those "free and constitutional institutions"
that are "the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of
press rests."9 6 The clear and present danger test had no bearing on
the case, he maintained, because no one had a constitutional right to
advocate revolutionary socialism.97 Sanborn thought that advocacy of
revolutionary socialism could be regulated because of its bad
tendency, but only because he first found that revolutionary socialism
was unconstitutional speech.9 8
During the same time period, influential proponents of the
freedom of contract frequently indicated that the First Amendment
did not protect overly strident attacks on private property because
such advocacy was also unconstitutional speech. In a 1919 article
published by the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, G. P.
Garrett claimed that only the "loyalist of independent mind" and the
member of the "political minority" had the right to criticize the
government.99 The advocate of "heresy" was not given this protection.
A heretic was defined as a person like Eugene V. Debs who "found his
doctrine opposed to the ruling influence of the American spirit."100
Garrett recommended that the speech of these persons be absolutely
prohibited: "without much need as to them for submitting the act to
the test of constitutionality, we turn material of this kind into the
jails."11 In a speech given the same year, George T. Page, the
president of the American Bar Association, suggested that
any law that might seem constitutional to a rational man). I have found no judicial opinion
authored by a proponent of the freedom of contract which uses the bad tendency test.
94. Some conservative libertarians did insist that government did not have to respect the
liberty of speech or contract during wartime. See George Sutherland, Constitutional Power and
World Affairs, 98-99, 101-04, 111-15 (Columbia U., 1919) (stating that Congress may
constitutionally enact restrictions on rights that in times of peace would be intolerable); Wilson
v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 359 (1917) (holding that emergency conditions during World War I justify
federal regulation of hours and wages).
95. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
96. Id. at 668 (quoting Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419 (1918)).
97. Id. at 670-71.
98. Id. at 668.
99. G. P. Garrett, Free Speech and the Espionage Act, 10 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 71, 73-
74 (1919).
100. Id. at 71.
101. Id. at 71-75.
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immigration officials should deport unconstitutional speakers.0 2 The
United States, he argued, must not only insist that the citizen
"renounce allegiance... to every foreign potentate and power" but the
citizen should also be required to abandon "every foreign 'ism' and
scheme of government not reconcilable with our own."103
Conservative judicial opinions frequently played variations on
the theme of unconstitutional speech. Justice Butler's dissent in
Stromberg v. Californiao4 suggested that "the anarchy that is certain
to follow a successful 'opposition to organized government"' might be
"a sufficient reason to hold that all activities to that end are outside
the 'liberty' so protected.' '0 5 More often, conservative justices merged
the doctrine of unconstitutional speech into some less controversial
basis for affirming governmental regulation of speech. In Pierce v.
United States,106 Justice Pitney declared a prediction that the draft
would become mandatory to be false, even though the draft had
become mandatory by the time the case came to the Supreme Court.0 7
Pitney's opinion in Pierce also hinted that socialism was so evidently
false that no person could advocate that doctrine on the basis of its
merits.0 8 Justice Van Devanter's dissent in Herndon v. Lowry'0 8
merged the categories of criminal and antirepublican advocacy.
Persons who advocated the abolition of republican institutions in the
United States, he claimed, were necessarily arguing for a revolution
because the American people would never peacefully tolerate such
changes.11o Van Devanter insisted that advocacy of Communism and
measures supported by Communists, in particular radical notions of
racial justice (by 1930 standards), could influence only those persons
whose "past and present circumstances" disabled them from
rationally recognizing the obvious fallacies of these policies."'
The leading enthusiasts for content restrictions on expression
in the next generation relied on a different conception of un-
constitutional speech than did conservative proponents of the liberty
102. George T. Page, Government, 5 A.BA.. J. 527, 537 (1919).
103. Id. at 537-39.
104. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
105. Id. at 376 (Butler, J., dissenting).
106. 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
107. Id. at 251.
108. Id. See id. at 264 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the prediction of the draft
was later verified).
109. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
110. Id. at 276 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting) (stating "for all know that such measures
could not be effected otherwise').
111. Id.
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of contract. By the eve of World War II, most American scholars
regarded the Constitution as a democratic document and the
Fourteenth Amendment as primarily protecting certain democratic
procedures." 2 Progressives and New Dealers thought that advocacy of
the most intrusive governmental regulation of commercial affairs was
not unconstitutional speech because the Constitution did not privilege
any economic arrangements. Instead, those persons who favored
regulating the advocacy of certain ideas in the years after the
Depression maintained that the Constitution did not, protect
undemocratic speech, the speech that they thought inconsistent with
fundamental Fourteenth Amendment and constitutional values.
Proponents of group libel laws in the 1930s and 1940s maintained
that undemocratic speech was not as protected by the Constitution as
was advocacy of those doctrines supportive or more consistent with
fundamental constitutional norms. Karl Loewenstein's calls in the
American Political Science Review for a more militant democracy
insisted that the basic democratic rights set out in the Constitution
should be withheld from persons and groups who were not willing to
respect those liberties."' Political scientists committed to combating
fascism, he stated, must recognize that "[ilt is the exaggerated
formalism of the rule of law which under the enchantment of formal
equality does not see fit to exclude from the game parties that deny
the very existence of its rules. ' '1 4 In Democracy and Defamation,
David Reisman made the related claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment gave government the power to ban speech that might
threaten the Constitution's democratic principles."5 Elected officials,
he wrote, had the right to enact content restrictions on speech "for the
active protection and encouragement of that widespread group
participation which will give meaning and future to democracy."" 6
Anticipating contemporary theorists, Reisman rejected notions that
free speech should be regarded only as a liberty against government.
In his opinion, it was no longer tenable to "continue a negative policy
of protection from the state," because such a policy "plays directly into
the hands of the groups whom supporters of democracy need most to
112. Graber, Transforming Free Speech at 165-67 (cited in note 21); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value 197-217, 235-
66 (U. of Kentucky, 1973).
113. Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 417, 424 (1937).
114. Id.
115. David Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 Colum. L.
Rev. 727, 732 (1942).
116. Id.
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fear."' 17 Thus, Reisman urged justices and legislators to scrutinize
closely the doctrines advocated by different political dissenters.
Censors, he thought, must "be discriminating in judging what sorts of
criticism-though mistaken in fact-further the democratic cause and
what sorts of defamatory falsehoods hinder it."18
Postwar essays by Carl Auerbach and Harry Jaffa further de-
veloped the new understanding that attacks on democratic principles
are not fully protected by the First Amendment. Auerbach insisted
that "[n]o democratic or constitutional principle is violated... when a
democracy acts to exclude those groups from entering the struggle for
political power which, if victorious, will not permit that struggle to
continue in accordance with the democratic way." 19  Government
suppression of Communist speech, he declared, was justified by "the
very same interests which freedom of speech itself seeks to
secure-the possibility of peaceful progress under freedom.' 120 Jaffa
maintained that "Communists and Nazis... have no right to the use
of free speech in a free society" because free speech "can never be
rightfully employed to propose the destruction of either a majority or
minority."' 21 In words that echo those of MacKinnon, this doyen of
American conservatism declared that "one cannot be equally tolerant
. . . of opinions destructive, and of opinions not destructive, of the
regime of liberty itself."' 22  Those members of the American Civil
Liberties Union who at the time sought to ban fascist expression also
claimed that the First Amendment only protected speakers who
endorsed the basic principles of constitutional democracy. Margaret
DeSilver, an influential liberal philanthropist, insisted that Nazis did
not have "the liberty to destroy liberty."' 23
This brief historical survey suggests that in every age the
leading proponents of various bans on certain ideas have insisted that
117. Id. at 780. See Michelman, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. at 303-05 (cited in note 59) (noting that a
healthy system of freedom of expression needs to protect "against suppression by
nongovernmental as well as by governmental power").
118. Reisman, 42 Colum. L. Rev. at 731.
119. Carl A. Auerbach, The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political
Theory of Free Speech, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 173, 195 (1956).
120. Id. at 188.
121. Henry J. Jaffa, On the Nature of Civil and Religious Liberty, in William F. Buckley, Jr.
and Charles R. Kesler, eds., Keeping the Tablets: Modern American Conservative Thought 145,
152 (Harper & Row, 1988).
122. Id. at 156. Compare MacKinnon, Only Words at 86 (cited in note 2) (stating that
"speech cases that consider words as triggers to violent action... submerge inequality issues
further").
123. Walker, In Defense of American Liberties at 116 (cited in note 15) (quoting Margaret
DeSilver).
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the First Amendment does not fully protect the right to deny or
criticize what their generation regards to be fundamental constitu-
tional values. Critical theorists correctly note that they share the
basic radical civil libertarian principles that animate the leading
contemporary defenders of free speech. What they fail to realize is
that the leading opponents of free speech in every generation have
typically endorsed the basic principles that have provided the foun-
dations for the leading constitutional defense of free speech in their
era. Debates over free speech throughout American history have
focused on whether the consensual constitutional paradigm of a
particular time supports or forbids bans on speech challenging that
paradigm.
For this reason, the leading proponents and opponents of free
speech in each generation typically have more in common with each
other than with the leading proponents and opponents of free speech
in other generations. Conservative thinkers at the turn of the
twentieth century agreed that the Constitution protected the freedom
of contract. While conservative libertarians understood Lochner as
establishing a broad sphere of private conduct that the government
could not regulate, 124 conservative censors understood Lochner as
expressing a basic principle of private property that could not be
questioned in extremis. Mid-twentieth century thinkers agreed that
democracy was the most important constitutional value. Classical
civil libertarians understood this commitment to democratic values as
requiring the establishment of a marketplace of ideas open to all
political and social doctrines; the leading proponents of restrictions on
speech in that era insisted that there was no freedom to call for the
abolition of democratic government in extremis. Contemporary
radical civil libertarians understand the Constitution to guarantee the
right of equal citizenship. Proponents of free speech maintain that
equal citizens must be equally free to express their personal
convictions in any way they please; critical theorists claim that the
Constitution does not fully protect speech that denies in extremis the
equal personhood of some members of the political community. Thus,
the particular use of radical civil libertarian principles to justify
restrictions on speech is new. The more general notion that the First
Amendment does not fully protect unconstitutional speech, however,
is not.
124. For a discussion of the conservative libertarian tradition, see Graber, Transforming
Free Speech at 17-44 (cited in note 21).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPEAKERS
Critical theorists and others who endorse some content re-
strictions on unconstitutional ideas should not be unceremoniously
drummed out of the civil libertarian movement. Both classical and
radical civil libertarianism encompass much more than a commitment
to free speech. 125 On a wide range of issues, from reproductive
liberties to the rights of criminal suspects, Matsuda, Lawrence, and
other proponents of bans on hate speech endorse positions that are
similar, if not identical to, those advocated by the ACLU. Indeed, a
strong minority of ACLU members have consistently supported re-
strictions on unconstitutional speech. 126 Many prominent civil liber-
tarians have sharply disagreed with ACLU decisions to defend other
rights. Meiklejohn, for example, opposed efforts to ban religious
exercises in public schools. 127 Hence, rather than require critical
theorists and their supporters to turn in their ACLU cards, the better
approach is to explore more fully whether libertarians of all
persuasions should interpret the First Amendment as protecting
unconstitutional speech.
Unfortunately, constitutional text and history offer very little
help in determining the constitutional rights of unconstitutional
speakers. The Equal Protection Clause, combined with the explicit
Congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, suggest
that the national government is authorized to ban hate speech
whenever such expression denies or threatens equal citizenship
principles. Raoul Berger maintains, with much justification, that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that Congress would
ultimately determine what rights were protected by the post-Civil
War Constitution and how those rights were best protected.28 On this
125. For a good history of civil libertarianism, see generally Walker, In Defense of American
Liberties (cited in note 15).
126. Id. at 60-61, 64, 83, 116.
127. Id. at 220.
128. Raoul Berger, Government By Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 221-29 (Harvard U., 1977). See Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (stating
that "[i]t is the power of Congress which has been enlarged Congress is authorized to enforce the
prohibitions by appropriate legislation'); Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 23, 1866),
reprinted in The Reconstruction Amendments' Debates 221-22 (Va. Comm'n on Constitutional
Gov't, 1967) (statement of Senator Howard) (stating that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
"casts upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the sections of the
amendment are carried out in good faith, and that no State infringes the rights of person or
property"). For similar conclusions, see Robert J. Harris, The Quest for Equality: The
Constitution, Congress and the Supreme Court 53-54 (Louisiana St. U., 1960); Joseph B. James,
The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 184 (U. of Illinois, 1956).
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originalist reading, a national ban on pornography or assaultive
speech would pass constitutional muster, although state bans might
not.129 The Privileges and Immunities Clause,130 however, suggests
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to weaken what-
ever rights American citizens previously had to criticize national
policies. Many civil libertarians contend that the post-Civil War
Constitution nationalized all the freedoms set out in the Bill of
Rights.'31 This reading of constitutional text and history supports the
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment did not dilute free speech
rights, but ensured that states would be required to respect existing
First Amendment liberties. On this originalist reading, therefore, if
the federal government had no power to regulate hate speech before
the Civil War, then state governments lost the power to regulate hate
speech after the war.
American political traditions offer no clearer guide to the
constitutional rights of unconstitutional speakers. Localities have
occasionally passed group libel laws, but those laws have rarely been
enforced and have frequently been repudiated by their sponsors13 2 A
closely divided Supreme Court did sustain group libel laws in
Beauharnais v. Illinois. s33  Most commentators, civil libertarian
commentators in particular, however, think that Beauharnais is no
longer good law.13 4 More generally, both the scope of free speech
129. The Supreme Court has ruled that the federal government has more power to adopt
race-conscious measures than localities. For decisions sustaining federal affirmative action
programs, see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) and Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980). For decisions declaring state affirmative action programs unconstitutional,
see Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and Regents of U. of California u. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). If, however, Berger is correct when he claims that the Framers gave the
federal judiciary no independent power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, then strict
originalists should regard states as free to regulate hate speech in the absence of inconsistent
federal legislation. See Berger, Government By Judiciary at 221-29.
130. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (stating "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States').
131. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
that "one of the chief objects that the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's first
section... were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to all states').
For scholarly claims that the post-Civil War amendments nationalized all the freedoms set out
in the Bill of Rights, see generally Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Duke U., 1986) (exploring the historical context and debate
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment); David A. J. Richards, Conscience and
the Constitution: History, Theory and Law of the Reconstruction Amendments (Princeton U.,
1993).
132. See Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy 77-100 (U.
of Nebraska, 1994) (discussing the rise and fall of group libel in America).
133. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
134. See, for example, Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography,
Blashphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 297, 330 (1988) (stating that "as a
matter of technical precedent Beauharnais comes to us as damaged goods"); Strossen, 1990
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rights and the affirmative power of government to promote equal
citizenship expanded dramatically during the third quarter of the
twentieth century.135 As a result, those on each side of the debates
over campus speech codes, bans on pornography, and related meas-
ures can point to an established line of judicial decisions and social
practices that support their position.
When text and history give conflicting signals, even the
strictest originalist or textualist must have recourse to more general
theories. Analyses of the constitutional rights of unconstitutional
speakers must focus on the relationship between the First
Amendment and the constitutional order. On one view, the consti-
tutional order constrains free speech rights. The First Amendment,
MacKinnon and others suggest, only protects advocacy of those doc-
trines that are consistent with fundamental constitutional princi-
ples.136 No constitution, in their view, can give persons the right to
subvert the constitutional regime. On a second view, the First
Amendment justifies and supports the constitutional order. A sound
constitutional democracy, in this view, should be self-perpetuating.
Tolerance of unconstitutional ideas demonstrates our constitutional
confidence that fundamental constitutional principles will triumph in
a democratic marketplace of ideas.
Duke L. J. at 518 (cited in note 7) (noting that "Beauharnais is widely assumed no longer to be
good law"); Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression at 396 (cited in note 33) (stating that
"little remains of the doctrinal structure of Beuaharnais').
135. See, for example, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-58 (1966) (ruling that the
federal government has broad power to define and remedy Fourteenth Amendment violations);
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968) (ruling that the Thirteenth
Amendment gives Congress the power to ban race discrimination in housing); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-62 (1964) (holding that Congress may use the
Commerce Clause to ban race discrimination in places of public accommodation); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-92 (1964) (ruling that public figures cannot win
damages for libel unless they prove "actual malice'; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49
(1969) (holding that states may only ban advocacy that is directed to and likely to produce
imminent lawless action); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971)
(holding that states must meet a "heavy burden" to justify a prior restraint on speech).
136. See notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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A. The Constitutional Case for Banning Unconstitutional Speech
Proponents of bans on unconstitutional speech derive free
speech rights from the inherent contestability of political and moral
ideas. Matsuda claims that government should respect the liberties
set out in the First Amendment "bhecause our ideas about what we
want as a society are changing and emergent... ... 137 In this world of
political and intellectual flux, she argues, "we cannot say that certain
ideas are unacceptable."''13 In her opinion, the moral of the civil
libertarian story is that "[w]e have no basis for distinguishing good
ideas from bad ideas. . . -1"39 Hence, "the only logical choice is to
protect all ideas.' ' 40
This grounding of free speech rights in a thoroughgoing intel-
lectual skepticism does have strong roots in the classical civil liber-
tarian tradition. Many of the most influential defenders of free
speech justify a system of free expression by pointing to the impos-
sibility of clearly establishing any truth about matters of public im-
portance. In the passage that many regard as "the greatest utterance
on intellectual freedom by an American,'"141 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., declared:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market .... 142
Learned Hand, another member of the civil libertarian pantheon,
similarly described "the spirit of liberty" as "the spirit which is not too
sure that it is right."4 3
Matsuda and Lawrence, however, maintain that time has
validated at least one fighting faith. Racist speech is a "sui generis"
exception to the general civil libertarian rule against content re-
strictions on speech, they claim, because of "the universal acceptance
137. Matsuda, Public Response at 32 (cited in note 4).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Max Lerner, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes: His Speeches, Essays, Letters and
Judicial Opinions 306 (Little, Brown, 1943). For compilations of other laudatory remarks, see
Richard Polenberg Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, the Supreme Court, and Free Speech 241
(Viking, 1987); Graber, Transforming Free Speech at 108 (cited in note 21).
142. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
143. Irving Dillard, ed., The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand 190
(Knopf, 3d ed. 1960).
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of the wrongness of the doctrine of racial supremacy."14  Matsuda
asserts: 'We know, from our collective historical knowledge, that
slavery was wrong. We know that white minority rule in South Africa
is wrong.' '145 "Racial supremacy[,]" she concludes, "is one of the ideas
we have collectively and internationally considered and rejected."146
Lawrence points out that members of the ACLU, in particular,
recognize that racist claims are utter nonsense. He notes that "most
[F]irst [A]mendment absolutists are reluctant to embrace" the
"possible 'truth' of racism .... -"4 If the content of racist speech is
certainly false, critical theorists assert, then a First Amendment
committed to discovering truth on matters of public importance
should not protect expressions of racial hate, particularly when such
speech causes tangible injuries.
This claim that racist doctrines have been universally rejected
is, unfortunately, wrong. Tribal politics in Europe, the former Soviet
Union, Africa, and the Middle East demonstrate that ideas of racial
supremacy are alive, well, and gaining strength in many societies148
The picture is no better domestically. Indeed, contemporary calls in
the United States for bans on hate speech are typically responses to
the national rise in racist incidents.149 This increase in hate crimes
and public expressions of intolerance demonstrate, at the very least,
that equal citizenship principles remain open to debate in many
American communities. Moreover, as the defeat of the Equal Rights
Amendment and President Clinton's failure to lift the ban on
homosexuals in the military indicate, no general social consensus
exists on the extent to which women and homosexuals should be
treated with equal concern and respect. Racist doctrines are even
making a comeback in the academy. Linda Gottfredson of the
University of Delaware, for example, maintains that "[slocial science
144. Matsuda, Public Response at 37 (cited in note 4).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Lawrence, If He Hollers at 75 (cited in note 4).
148. See generally Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of
Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge U., 1994); Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A
Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (U.S. Inst. of Peace, 1993).
149. See, for example, Lawrence, If He Hollers at 53-55 (cited in note 4) (noting several
examples of racist incidents on college campuses); Charles R. Lawrence III, et al., Introduction,
in Mari J. Matsuda, et al., eds., Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech,
and the First Amendment, 1, 1 (Westview, 1993) (citing a report by the National Institute
Against Prejudice and Violence that 65% to 75% minority students reported some form of
"ethnoviolent harassment"; Matsuda, Public Response at 44 (cited in note 4) (commenting on the
marked rise of racial incidents on university campuses). See also Delgado, Words That Wound
at 90 (cited in note 46) (observing "[tihe idea that color is a badge of inferiority and a
justification for the denial of opportunity and equal treatment is deeply ingrained'.
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today condones and perpetrates a great falsehood," the view that
"racial-ethnic groups never differ in average developed intelligence."'150
In her view, "the existence of sometimes large group differences in
intelligence is as well-established as any fact in the social sciences.151
Some persons of color have joined the fray, claiming that African-
Americans are more creative intellectually than white persons be-
cause persons of color have higher concentrations of melanin in their
skin.152
A modified version of the certainty thesis, however, can
overcome the empirical difficulties that beset claims that modern
societies uniformly reject claims of racial supremacy. Racist doctrines
are still being debated politically and academically, but the
Constitution unequivocally guarantees that all persons are entitled to
equal concern and respect. This emphasis on constitutional as
opposed to epistemological certainty provides a firmer foundation for
bans on racist and sexist speech. MacKinnon, in particular, reads the
Constitution's commitment to race and sex equality as demonstrating
the triumph of equal citizenship principles in the American
marketplace of ideas. The principle of equal citizenship, she suggests,
"is not supposed to be debatable to the same degree as is the
organization of the economy."'15  In her opinion, a society con-
stitutionally committed to equal citizenship need not subject egali-
tarian ideals to unnecessary competition, particularly when the ex-
pression of contrary ideas defeats egalitarian values. Equality,
MacKinnon declares, is a "'compelling state interest' that can already
outweigh First Amendment rights in certain settings."'' 4  "[Wihen
equality is taken seriously in expressive settings," she concludes,
racist and sexist speech is "not constitutionally insulated from
150. Linda S. Gottfredson, Egalitarian Fiction and Collective Fraud, 31 Society 53, 53
(March/April 1994).
151. Id. Prominent journals continue to be filled with articles debating whether persons of
color and women have smaller brain capacities and lower IQs than Caucasians and men.
Intelligence, in particular, is a haven for scholars interested in the racial and sexual determi-
nants of intelligence. See generally J. Philippe Rushton, Cranial Capacity Related to Sex, Rank,
and Race in a Stratified Random Sample of 6,325 U.S. Military Personnel, 16 Intelligence 401
(1992); C. Davison Ankney, Sex Differences in Relative Brain Size: The Mismeasure of Women,
Too?, 16 Intelligence 329 (1992); John C. Loehlin, Should We Do Research on Race Differences in
Intelligence?, 16 Intelligence 1 (1992); Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell
Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (Free, 1994); J. Phillippe Rushton,
Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective (Transaction, 1995).
152. For a critical review of melanists and their claims, see generally Bernard R. Ortiz de
Montellano, Melanin, Afrocentricity, and Pseudoscience, 36 Yearbook of Physical Anthropology
33 (1993).
153. Macinnon, Only Words at 39 (cited in note 2).
154. Id. at 107 (footnote omitted).
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regulation on the ground that the ideas they express cannot be
regarded as false."' 55
This defense of hate speech regulations does not depend on the
objective falsehood of racial supremacy or a universal condemnation of
racism. MacKinnon is undoubtedly certain that all communities
should treat women and persons of color with the same solicitude as
white men. Her argument, however, only depends on the simpler and
clearly correct claim that the Constitution condemns racism. The
Constitution, she points out, grants government and citizens a wide
variety of policy options. 56 The First Amendment protects the right of
all persons to advocate any of these constitutionally legitimate
policies. This right is limited, however, to the advocacy of policies and
principles that can be adopted within the constitutional order.
Persons have no free speech rights, in this view, to advance principles
or policies that are fundamentally antithetic to basic constitutional
values. Such principles as racism or the divine right of monarchs may
be philosophically debatable, but that debate cannot take place within
a constitutional order committed to democratic and egalitarian ideals.
Interpreted simply, claims that persons only have a
constitutional right to advocate constitutionally legitimate ideas seem
either pernicious or silly. No one thinks the national government has
the constitutional power to punish persons who attack any
constitutional provision or authoritative interpretation of that pro-
vision. The First Amendment clearly protects the right to advocate a
six year presidential term or criticize the Supreme Court's decisions
in free exercise cases. Critical Jewish theorists do not call on
Congress to ban verbal attacks on Engel v. Vitale157 because sharp
critiques of that decision in many communities cause Jewish parents
and children to forego constitutional challenges to prayer in the local
public school.
The constitutional rules for amendment set out in Article V
seemingly demonstrate that persons must be constitutionally free to
criticize any constitutional provision or principle. With one or two
present exceptions, the Constitution apparently permits superma-
joritarian coalitions to alter, abandon, or contradict every clause in
the text.158 If the Constitution treats all constitutional provisions as
155. Id. at 106.
156. Id. at 39.
157. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
158. One exception is evident from the text of Article V, which declares that "no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." Also, as Will Harris
points out, the Constitution does not clearly indicate whether Americans may constitutionally
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mutable, then, contrary to MacKinnon's claim, the principle of equal
citizenship must be as open to debate as the organization of the
economy. Thus, the First and Fourteenth amendments do not rec-
ognize a category of unconstitutional speech. Advocacy of any idea, no
matter how subversive of basic constitutional commitments, is
implicitly licensed by the apparent universal scope of Article V.
Prominent constitutional theorists, however, suggest a dif-
ferent notion of unconstitutional speech that is not open to these
objections. Walter Murphy points out that the very meaning of
"amendment" limits the changes to the Constitution that may be
passed in accordance with the procedures outlined in Article V.1 9 'To
amend[,]" he points out, "means to modify or rephrase, so as to add or
subtract.' 160 A constitutional clause specifying how the Constitution
is to be amended, in this view, only authorizes new provisions that
amount to "a rephrasing, modification, or correction[,]" and not
additions that amount to "a remaking."' 6'
Murphy sees the "provisions of the constitutional document[ ]"
as "differ[ing] markedly in fundamentality.'16 2 "Some[,]" he claims,
"represent more or less arbitrary arrangements .... ,"163 These can be
amended at will, provided the appropriate amending procedures are
used. Other clauses, however, "reflect basic principles of political
theory."' 64  Murphy contends that "certain rights-for example, to
even-handed governmental treatment and to privacy in the sense of
being let alone in many intimate relationships-form integral parts of
the American 'constitution.'165 "Clauses protecting these rights[,]" he
concludes, "are not repealable, nor are they amendable so as to
weaken them .... ,"16  Murphy and other scholars who defend the
notion of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment agree that
the citizens of the United States can radically alter their form of
government. 167 Moreover, they debate whether the Supreme Court
amend the amendment procedure specified in Article V. William F. Harris, The Interpretable
Constitution 176C-87 (Johns Hopkins U., 1993).
159. Walter F. Murphy, The Nature of the American Constitution 32 (U. of Illinois, 1989).
160. Id.
161. Id. See Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 182-83 (cited in note 158).
162. Murphy, The Nature of the American Constitution at 23.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
166. Id. See Auerbach, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 194 (cited in note 119) (noting that the
Constitution impliedly excludes any amendment that would exchange its democratic character).
167. Murphy, The Nature of the American Constitution at 34-35. See Harris, The
Interpretable Constitution at 166 (cited in note 158) (discussing the internal restraints on
amendability within the Constitution itself).
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should ever declare a constitutional amendment unconstitutional. 168
Their point is simply that 'the [C]onstitution,' broadly or narrowly
defined, cannot authorize or legitimate" such radical changes. 169
"Constitutional amendment under Article V[,]" Will Harris observes,
"is still change generated from the inside.., bound by the rules of the
American constitutional enterprise .... 217
If the Constitution cannot "authorize or legitimate" amend-
ments that weaken or abolish fundamental constitutional values, then
a First Amendment limited to advocacy of constitutionally legitimate
change may not protect speech that denies or threatens fundamental
constitutional values. The Constitution, arguments for bans on
unconstitutional speech suggest, cannot give anyone the right to
interfere with the realization of fundamental constitutional
principles. Hence, speakers who advocate unconstitutional ideas
cannot claim First Amendment protection when they seek to
overthrow the constitutional order. Indeed, Harris suggests that
Americans might consider a constitutional amendment that prohibits
persons who hold fundamentally unconstitutional beliefs from voting
or holding political office. Such a rule, he believes, would provide for
an 'impeachment' of citizens" insufficiently "attached to the
Constitution."17
Once Americans recognize that different constitutional pro-
visions have different constitutional status, critical theorists think
that their fellow citizens will easily be able to distinguish
constitutional bans on hate speech from unconstitutional bans on the
advocacy of communism or a balanced-budget amendment. Radical
civil libertarians claim that the principle of equal personhood is
central to the Constitution in a way that the present economic order
and budgetary process are not. The Constitution, Lawrence, Strossen,
and others agree, allows Americans to choose any economic system
and regards the present budgetary process as one of those
constitutional arrangements that is "more or less arbitrary."7 2 Thus,
Article V sanctions a balanced budget amendment and amendments
that radically redistribute property rights. Article V cannot, however,
sanction an amendment repealing the Equal Protection Clause or an
168. See Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 169 n.3 (questioning whether any
institutional interpreter would have constitutional authority to strike a technically valid amend-
ment, despite observable inconsistency with the core of the Constitution).
169. Murphy, The Nature of the American Constitution at 33 (cited in note 159).
170. Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 205 (cited in note 158).
171. Id. at 203-04.
172. Murphy, The Nature of the American Constitution at 23 (cited in note 159).
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amendment that abolishes the constitutional right all persons enjoy to
equal concern and respect. If the principle of equal citizenship cannot
be changed within the present constitutional order, then the present
constitutional order should not grant anyone a right to challenge the
principle of equal citizenship. At a minimum, the First Amendment
ought to give more protection to advocacy that seeks to perfect the
existing constitutional order than advocacy that is subversive of that
order. For this reason, critical theorists think that government can
regulate racist speech even when neither the immediacy nor the
degree of threatened harm of such expression would justify regulating
constitutionally protected expression.
Proponents of bans on hate speech must still demonstrate that
equal citizenship is a fundamental constitutional value. Given the
power of racist and sexist ideologies in American political thought,173
this may not be an easy task. Still, MacKinnon and others seem to
have the better of their argument with contemporary ACLU
absolutists. All radical civil libertarians agree that equal citizenship
is a fundamental constitutional value. When contemporary First
Amendment absolutists recognize that Americans cannot adopt
policies or constitutional amendments that weaken our constitutional
commitment to equal concern and respect, then they will understand
why the right to free speech cannot encompass invective that
implicitly or explicitly denies the equal citizenship of some members
of the American community.
B. Free Speech and "The Machine That Would Go of Itself"74
Sound theories of the First Amendment must recognize that
Americans regard their Constitution as permanent. Although some
Framers, Thomas Jefferson in particular, did not believe that one
generation could bind another, Americans between 1787 and 1789
ratified a Constitution that they "intended to endure for ages to
come.' 175 Bans on unconstitutional speech apparently buttress the
173. See Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartr The Multiple
Traditions in America, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 549, 558-63 (1993) (arguing that inegalitarian
ideologies have significantly influenced the substance of American politics).
174. This phrase is borrowed from Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself-
The Constitution in American Culture (Knopf, 1986).
175. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). See Merrill D. Peterson,
ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson 444-51 (Viking, 1975). For an excellent discussion of the
debate over precommitment in early American political thought, see Stephen Holmes,
Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds.,
Constitutionalism and Democracy 195, 199-221 (Cambridge U., 1988).
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constitutional order. Citizens are less likely to perceive constitutional
weaknesses when unconstitutional speakers lack the right to chal-
lenge basic constitutional values.
This interpretation of the relationship between the First
Amendment and the constitutional order, however, is seriously
flawed. No one thinks that persons who ratify the Constitution,
whether in 1789 or 1995,176 surrender their power to observe that the
Constitution is not working. Citizens would clearly want to know if
something was so fundamentally wrong with basic constitutional
values that the people constituted by that document should
reconstitute themselves under a new Constitution. Moreover,
Americans who have not been exposed to unconstitutional speech may
lack the perspective necessary for a intelligent commitment to the
constitutional polity. 'The constitutional order can be considered
ratifiable," Harris points out, "only in the context of a capacity to
envision (and to endorse) a fundamentally different alternative.'
For these reasons, Constitutions cannot and should not irrevocably
bind a people to maintaining a particular constitutional regime.
The Declaration of Independence suggests a different means
for permanently enshrining constitutional values, tolerating uncon-
stitutional speech. 17 The famous second paragraph of the Declaration
announces that Americans "hold these truths to be self-evident: that
all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness."179 By "self-evident," Jefferson did not mean
to imply that persons could comprehend natural rights without
reflecting on philosophical and political ideas. As Garry Wills points
out, "there is a labor to be performed in grasping even the self-
evident.' 180 Jefferson's point was simply that when basic American
176. As Sandy Levinson points out, every generation of Americans must, in an important
sense, decide whether to sign the Constitution. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 180-94
(Princeton U., 1988).
177. Harris, The Interpretable Constitution at 166 (cited in note 158). Significantly, Harris
suggests that Americans might consider denying the right to vote and hold office to citizens
insufficiently attached to constitutional values, but not the right to free speech. See note 171
and accompanying text.
178. Indeed, Murphy maintains that the Declaration of Independence is, in an important
sense, part of the Constitution. Murphy, The Nature of the American Constitution at 13-14, 25-
27 (cited in note 159). See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 105 (1873) (Field,
J., dissenting) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to give practical effect
to the Declaration of Independence).
179. Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson at 235 (cited in note 175).
180. Garry Wills, Inventing America. Jefferson's Declaration of Independence 191
(Doubleday, 1978).
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commitments are placed before citizens "in terms so plain and firm,"
those principles will eventually "command their assent."18 The
Federalist Papers express a similar confidence in the rational appeal
of basic constitutional principles. Publius declares that
"deliberat[ions] on a new Constitution for the United States of
America" will establish "whether societies of men are really capable or
not of establishing good government from reflection and choice .... ,"182
Both founding documents suggest that Americans are reasonable
people and that reasonable people on reflection will choose the
fundamental principles that provide the foundation for the
constitutional regime. The First Amendment institutionalizes this
faith in the power of constitutional ideals and the intelligence of the
American people. The founders of the constitutional order favored a
system of free expression because they were certain that basic
constitutional norms would inevitably triumph in the Constitution's
marketplace of ideas.
A constitutional democracy can only exist in a society whose
citizens accept and endorse the basic values of the constitutional
order. Moreover, constitutional principles must appeal to people as
they are presently constituted, and not a people that must first be
reeducated before they can recognize the subtle charms of the
Constitution. These people may temporarily succumb to unconsti-
tutional temptations. Hence, constitutional societies often design
such institutions as judicial review to uphold constitutional values in
times of particular stress.183 Nevertheless, the idea of precom-
mitment, the idea that constitutional systems should create mecha-
nisms that permit appeals from the present people drunk to the past
people sober, presumes that the people will soon sober up and
recognize their constitutional transgressions. When citizens do not in
the long run retain allegiance to constitutional principles, a
constitutional democracy simply fails and must be replaced by an-
other Constitution or form of government.
181. Peterson, ed., The Portable Thomas Jefferson at 235 (cited in note 175).
182. Federalist 1 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 33, 33 (Mentor,
1961).
183. For discussions of how well the judiciary has performed this function, see generally
Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights 91-145 (Yale U., 1982); Mark
Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 123-33 (Harvard U.,
1988); Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court & Constitutional Theory, 1953-1993 (U. of Kansas,
1994); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 Studies in American Political Development 35 (Spring 1993); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (U. of Chicago, 1991).
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Properly understood, the system of free expression is as central
as the system of checks and balances to the self-regulating machine
that the Framers of the Constitution intended to establish. By
diffusing power both within the national government and over a large
republic of states, the persons responsible for the Constitution sought
to create an equilibrium in which no interest or branch of government
would become strong enough to create a tyranny. 84 American
constitutionalism maintains that a free political process will create a
similar equilibrium. Citizens living in a sound constitutional
democracy, constitutional and democratic theory suggests, should
never abandon their self-evident democratic and constitutional rights.
If the basic values of the constitutional order are sound, then the
system of free expression will ensure that each successive generation
ratifies the constitutional order.
The First Amendment in this vision of constitutional democ-
racy expresses both constitutional certainties and doubts. Some
questions are left open to political debate because no right answer can
be found in the Constitution. The Constitution says nothing about
whether employee mandates are feasible in the health care system
and only gives a tentative answer to the proper length of a
presidential term. Other questions, however, are left open to debate
because free speech creates the only political environment necessary
for fundamental constitutional provisions to be consistently endorsed
by the people. The correct reply to critical theorists who ask "Why
tolerate unconstitutional ideas we know to be false," is "why ban
competition to constitutional ideas we know to be true?" State
officials only ban that which they believe may subvert the citizenry.
Radical civil libertarians who tolerate racist ideas share their
Constitution's confidence both in the American people and in the self-
evidence of equal citizenship ideals. Many persons may be hurt by
claims that they are not worthy of full citizenship, but ultimately the
system of free expression promises that Americans will be capable of
recognizing that all persons are entitled to equal concern and respect.
184. This theory is most clearly set out in Federalist 10 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers at 77-84 (cited in note 182) and Federalist 51 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers at 320-25.
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C. The Problem of Market Failure
Many critical theories regard this faith in the marketplace of
ideas as "heroic,185 "appealing, lofty, romantic-and wrong."''1 6
Proponents of equal citizenship and proponents of racism do not, in
their view, compete before a neutral people capable of discerning the
best vision of their constitutional order. Many radical civil lib-
ertarians charge that bigots presently enjoy unfair competitive ad-
vantages in the ideological marketplace. Elected officials who for
more than two hundred years sent racist, sexist, and heterosexist
messages to the citizenry have created a populace instinctively at-
tracted to traditional forms of domination and almost impervious to
egalitarian ideals.187 Advocates of bans on hate speech maintain that
continued tolerance of certain expressions of prejudice further
magnifies the preferred position of white, male supremacy in
American political culture. Avid consumers of pornography who have
been trained to see women exclusively as sex objects, for example,
may not take seriously a woman's perspective on recent trade
problems with Japan, to say nothing of a woman's perspective on
comparative worth.
Few civil libertarians of any stripe dispute claims that the
present marketplace of ideas is in ill health. Even proponents of free
speech who reject governmental efforts to equalize speech through
access rights or campaign finance reform recognize that wealthy
interests enjoy increasing hegemony in the media and the electoral
process.188 Much evidence also indicates that silencing is a real and
disturbing phenomenon, particularly with respect to women.
Prominent studies find that women are less likely to speak in class
than men, that they are less likely to be asked serious questions, and
that their answers are less likely to be taken seriously. 189
185. Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 128 (cited in note 2).
186. Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1288 (cited in note 59).
187. See Gale, 65 St. John's L. Rev. at 152-53 (cited in note 2) (dissolving the libertarian
argument privileging private speech and divorcing it from state speech that violates equal
rights). See also notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
188. See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 646, 651 (1982) (stating that government
restrictions would favor political elites); L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First
Amendment, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 243, 282 (1983) (noting that "lilt is hard to dispute that the
wealthy seem to enjoy tremendous influence); Martin H. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws
and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 900, 901 (1971) (noting that "the danger of
establishing a more-or-less rigidly defined ruling aristocracy of the wealthy has become a very
real one'.
189. See generally Bernice Resnick Sandler, The Campus Climate Revisited: Chilly for
Women Faculty, Administrators, and Graduate Students (Ass'n of American Colleges, 1986).
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Still, claims that the marketplace of ideas is substantially bi-
ased against constitutional principles overlook the political context in
which debates over hate speech take place. Too many critical
theorists forget that the crucial question is not whether the mar-
ketplace of ideas is, in general, too biased against egalitarian ideals,
but whether the marketplace of ideas in a community considering
whether to ban hate speech is too biased against egalitarian ideals.
Citizens may not be adequately exposed to equal citizenship princi-
ples in communities whose governing officials refuse to treat many
citizens with equal concern and respect. Such communities, however,
do not ban hate speech (and when they do, the purpose of such
regulations is to mask unconstitutional practices). Citizens who live
in communities in which proponents of bans on bigoted invective
wield considerable political power, by comparison, are probably
already adequately exposed and sufficiently free to accept equal
citizenship principles. Indeed, radical civil libertarianism often
represents the status quo in settings conducive to bans on hate
speech. As Samuel Walker notes, "[riestrictive codes have been
adopted [on college campuses] because the idea has a [pre-existing]
well-organized coalition of advocates"'190 that actively espouses the
principle of equal concern and respect in numerous settings, typically
with the imprimatur of influential faculty and administrators. For
these reasons, the obvious breakdown of the constitutional
marketplace of ideas in too many regions of the United States cannot
justify bans on hate speech in those communities that are likely to
consider such measures seriously.
Arguments about silencing suffer from the same failure to
consider political context. Frank Michelman correctly notes that a
system of free expression may be subverted by both private and public
censorship.191 The notion that government should restrict speech that
silences others, however, assumes a highly implausible state of
affairs. For an anti-silencing ban on speech to be enacted and ap-
propriate, members of group A must have the private power to silence
members of group B in a community where members of (or persons
For a good summary of recent studies, see Bartlett and O'Barr, 1990 Duke L. J. at 575-81 (cited
in note 7).
190. Walker, Hate Speech at 16 (cited in note 132). Of course, some students and faculty do
refrain from expressing their radical civil libertarian commitments too strongly. At least as
many students and faculty, however, probably refrain from making strong attacks on radical
civil libertarian principles. Thus, the vast majority of students on most college campuses are
probably as exposed to equal citizenship principles as they are to theories that support race and
gender domination.
191. Michelman, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. at 304 (cited in note 59).
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sympathetic to) group B have the political power necessary to silence
members of group A. Such a disjunction between private and public
power is philosophically possible, but practically unlikely. Silencing
is most likely to occur in communities where members of the silenced
group lack both private and public power. Communities that want to
hear the voice of outsiders have more effective means at their disposal
than bans on the speech of their alleged silencers.
Properly understood, the debate over hate speech is not about
how to empower the powerless, but about what proponents of equal
citizenship should do when in power. Unfortunately, the constant
emphasis on historically subordinated groups in too much critical
legal, race, and feminist theory encourages citizens to see themselves
exclusively as victims rather than as persons who exercise varying
degrees of power in different circumstances.192 Any political coalition
that is willing and able to ban hate speech probably possesses the
power necessary to create environments in which their fellow citizens
will be free to listen to and endorse their more egalitarian
principles.193 If citizens reject radical civil libertarian principles in
these settings, the fault may lie with the principles and not with the
citizenry.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the sound and fury of the hate speech debate, nothing
much depends on whether legislatures adopt and courts sustain
moderate bans on the expression of unconstitutional ideas. Many
European countries regulate group libel. Although these laws do little
more than change the phrases that racists use,194 foreign restrictions
on bigoted invective have not inspired a reign of terror. Mild
regulations of racial and other epithets are also unlikely to affect the
intellectual climate on most campuses. College students avoid saying
192. For a discussion of how members of the most marginal social groups exercise power on
numerous occasions, see generally James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of
Peasant Resistance (Yale U., 1985). The failure to acknowledge that victims of power also
exercise power is a sure recipe for encouraging abuses of power.
193. When political coalitions with the power to ban racist speech do not adopt other anti-
racism measures, their bans on racist speech may be designed more for the purpose of forestall-
ing more serious attacks on racism than for promoting equal citizenship. See Kretzmer, 8
Cardozo L. Rev. at 508 (cited in note 2) (stating that even an efficacious law banning racist
speech may not contribute to reducing racial prejudice and discrimination).
194. See id. at 507. "In Britain this prohibition on the cruder forms of racist speech forced
racists to seek more sophisticated formulations of their propaganda.... The result, apparently,
was an increase in the appeal of racist propaganda." Id.
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anything remotely controversial in universities that do and do not ban
some expressions of prejudice (except when they are confident that
their "controversial" views are, in fact, the status quo). More
significantly, the anonymity of modern life and the exorbitant cost of
new communication technologies have done more than hate speech to
create a citizenry with neither the necessary capacity nor interest for
participating actively in the marketplace of ideas.195 Buffeted by the
forces of mass society and the technological revolution, too many
Americans at present lack the desire or resources needed to become
seriously involved in the social and political life of their communities.
Bans on hate speech do nothing to solve this contemporary
crisis of political participation.196 Equal citizenship ideals are also not
likely to be promoted by teach-ins and other programs where students
and citizens quickly learn the expected "right" answers. Instead of
banning speech, progressives in power need to create fora where all
citizens feel free to exchange their ideas. Too many critical theorists,
unfortunately, think that most Americans must be reeducated before
they should be empowered. The system of free expression, in their
view, must be partially suspended until the populace can be trusted to
resist the blandishments of racial and other prejudices. The
successful use of barely coded racist appeals in recent political
campaigns indicates that this pessimistic view of Americans may well
be correct. If critical theorists are right, however, then the
Constitution is wrong in a way unlikely to be repaired. Constitutional
democracy is based on the assumption that citizens as presently
constituted will upon reflection endorse basic constitutional values. If
radical civil libertarians cannot convince their communities of the
virtues of equal citizenship, then the question they need to ask is not
how the Constitution might be reinterpreted to create a more
hospitable environment for egalitarian ideals, but whether a different
constitutional order is possible. 97
195. See Graber, Transforming Free Speech at 185-87 (cited in note 21). See generally
Ronald K. L. Collins and David M. Skover, The Pornographic State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1374
(1994).
196. Indeed, the notion of silencing may be a conceptual relative to trickle-down economics.
Just as some conservatives maintain that we can somehow get more tax revenues by lowering
taxes, so some liberals maintain that we can somehow get more speech by prohibiting the
expression of some ideas.
197. See Post, 32 Win. & Mary L. Rev. at 327 (cited in note 39).
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